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1. NEW SOVIET DISARMAMENT OFFER ACCEPTS HIGHER ARMED FORCES LIMITS

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The outstanding proposal in the four-point disarmament plan offered by Soviet delegate Gromyko in the UN Disarmament Commission on 12 July was an offer to accept the

maximum limits for the armed forces of the major powers proposed by the United States. These limits are higher than those on which the USSR has been insisting since May 1955. While sticking to the lower figures as a final goal, the USSR agreed as a first step to 2,500,000 men instead of 1,500,000 for the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and to 750,000 instead of 650,000 for Britain and France. The new Soviet plan, however, still limits all other countries to 200,000 men, instead of the 500,000 proposed by the United States.

The USSR will again claim that it has made the concession of accepting a Western disarmament proposal. The lower manpower figures on which the USSR had been insisting were first proposed by the West, and Gromyko charged on 12 July that the West might again raise the levels to avoid agreement. If the USSR carries out both the one-year 1,200,-000-man cut announced on 14 May and the 640,000-man cut previously announced, it will then have about 2,400,000 men in its military forces. In any case, the USSR will argue that it has not only agreed to but is already complying with the United States proposal. The US forces currently total about 2,800,000 men.

Gromyko repeated his 3 July proposal for an agreement of all countries not to use atomic or hydrogen weapons and reintroduced suggestions made in May 1955 for the banning of such weapons, the elimination of existing stocks, and an immediate ban on testing. In the London Disarmament Subcommittee talks this spring, Gromyko had subordinated the question of nuclear prohibition to immediate steps toward conventional disarmament. The latest Soviet proposal also calls for "effective control" in both fields.

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2.	<b>IRAQI</b>	CHIEF	OF STA	AFF	MAKES	"LAST-HOUR"
					ARMS	

	APPEAL FOR MORE US ARMS	
2	25X1A	
25X1A	The American army attaché in Baghdad has reported a conversation in which Iraq's Chief of Staff Rafiq made a "last-hour" appeal for increased US military aid. Rafiq said that "half-measures" will no longer ensure Iraqi allegiance to the West.	
	The chief of staff said he was unable to explain the "intricacies" of US military aid satisfactorily to Iraqi politicians and junior officers, who compare the American arms program with the large, highly publicized deliveries of Soviet arms to Egypt and Syria. Rafiq said that "under the surface" elements in Iraq are "seething" and that only immediate delivery of arms and material will realign this attitude and prove that Iraqi leaders were correct in siding with the West.	
	The attaché reports that his contacts with civilians and junior officers confirm Rafiq's apprehe sions, and he believes Rafiq is not merely making anothe attempt to apply pressure.	n- r
25X1		
	Comment  By joining the Baghdad pact, Iraq hop obtain strong economic and military so port which might enable it to replace Egypt as the leader Arab world. Disillusionment has been growing for some as a result of the failure of other Arab states to join the The recent de-emphasis of the military aspects of the paprobably increased dissatisfaction within the Iraqi army, is regarded as the symbol of national prestige.	sup- of the time pact. ct has
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## 3. NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ICELANDIC GOVERNMENT

25X1A	there are diff	Several days of cabinet negotiate tween the Progressives and the nist-dominated Labor Alliance formation of a new Icelandic good general agreement on economic policy erences over foreign policy and the acts, according to a Social Democratic	Commu- on the vernment cy, but ssignment
	tions with the fears that the amending the	The Progressives, with their S llies, reportedly decided to enter into Communists primarily because of Progressives might join the Communication so as to deprive the Progressive over-representation in parliament	negotia- rogressive mists in gressives
	Comment to form a cab Alliance on the each party in	The Progressive Party authorischairman, Hermann Jonasson, sinet with the Social Democrats and the basis of equal representation—two the cabinet.	to attempt e Labor
	the nation's e land's continu some interpa	The Communists are eager to pernment in order to gain a decisive in conomy. They might for this purpose and formal membership in NATO, party understanding is reached on a polywithdrawal of American troops.	fluence in e accept <b>Ic</b> e ticularly if
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4.	<b>JAPANESE</b>	DIPLOMATS	FORESEE	NO SOVIET
	CONCESSIO	NS IN RENE	WED PEAC	E TALKS

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25X1A		
to make any fer to retur bassy spect conferees w	The Japanese embassy in London expressed the opinion that the US has a "very strong" bargaining personal tion in renewed peace negotiation at apparently feels the Soviet Union is understorial concession beyond its previous Shikotan and the Habomai Islands. The plated that after some initial maneuvering will reach quick agreement, along the linear formula, to exchange diplomatic mission.	SR osi- is with likely ous of- e em- g the es of
new effort i talks would representat	The embassy felt the lack of properties talks would prejudice the success in London. It noted various indications to be held in Moscow, among them chief Solive Malik's plan to return to the Soviet can and Premier Bulganin's strong recomm scow during the recent fishery negotiation.	ss of a hat the oviet apital nenda-
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## 5. BRITISH MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT ON CYPRUS

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Prime Minister Eden's statement on 12 July that Lord Radcliffe is to draft a constitution for self-government on Cyprus is the remnant of a broader proposal involving eventual self-determination, which Britain last week abandoned because of Turkey's vehement opposition. There is nothing in the present British

statement that will win either Greek or Turkish support. The basic problem of self-determination for Cyprus--which Athens demands and Ankara rejects--remains unsolved.

The move to proceed with development of constitutional self-government in the colony, which appears to have no chance of gaining Cypriot co-operation, is dictated largely by the Eden government's need to meet continuing public criticism.

As recently as 6 July, Foreign Office permanent under secretary Kirkpatrick indicated his view that both the Greek and the Turkish attitudes had stiffened, and implied that the cabinet had no further ideas for British action toward a solution. He said he personally thought the best prospects might lie in some form of partition of the island between Greece and Turkey.

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<b>6. NEW RUMAN</b> 25X1A	IAN OVERTURE TO FRANCE	
come for Fra- in Rumania ar and Poland as the American	Former Rumanian Liberal Party Gheorghe Tatarescu, who was re tated in late 1955, informed the minister in Bucharest that "the t nce to assume her former position of i nd act in Rumania as well as in Czecho the link between East and West," acco legation in Bucharest. Tatarescu sug mian cultural agreement as the first st	habili- French ime has nfluence slovakia ording to gested a
former minor chosen by the the East.	When pressed by the French min rity party figure agreed that Rumania h USSR for the mission of attracting Fr	ad been
are part of a port of Weste	Tatarescu presumably is being upress regime policies. The Run line with several recent Satellite move general Soviet bloc effort to weaken Forn policies. The Czech and Polish prove recently asked French officials for its is to Paris; the French have already iewicz.	nanian ves which rench sup- emiers, for invitations to
to broaden Sa cious of Sovi caution.	The French generally are eager atellite contacts with the West, but ren et bloc motives and can be expected to	nain suspi-
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 1700, 12 July)

Nothing of significance to report.

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